Page 1 of 11

Journal for Studies in Management and Planning

Available at http://internationaljournalofresearch.org/index.php/JSMaP

e-ISSN: 2395-0463

Volume 01 Issue 03

April 2015

Available online: http://internationaljournalofresearch.org/ P a g e | 311

Nuclear Deterrence: More Nukes for Stable Peace?

Maneesha Tripathi1

1Ph.D. Scholar, Department of Political Science, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi

E-mail: tripathi.maneesha89@gmail.com

Abstract

Nuclear deterrence is sometimes treated as a

known quantity-a definite thing that keeps us

safe and ensures our security. It has also

often been used as a justification for

possessing nuclear weapons. It was widely

believed that nuclear weapons were an

important factor in maintaining the "long

peace" between the United States and the

Soviet Union during the Cold War. India had

sighted it’s not so friendly neighbour China

as a reason for its nuclearisation. While

Pakistan in turn sighted threat from India for

going nuclear. Is nuclear deterrence oblique

encouragement for nuclear proliferation?

Moreover, deterrence in the twenty-first

century may be far more difficult than it was

in the past, and having the right mix of

nuclear capabilities to deal with the new

challenges will be crucial. New nuclear

powers, characteristics of rivalry, are

considered unlikely to maintain stable

deterrence.

This paper attempts to address the question

that has nuclear deterrence theory led to

more nuclearisation. And whether it is

actually relevant in maintaining stability

especially in contemporary scenario?

Keywords:

Nuclearisation, Deterrence, Proliferation,

Stability, Peace, Nuclear Powers

Introduction

Deterrence is defined most economically by

Glenn Snyder as ‘‘the power to dissuade’’

(Glenn H. Snyder, ‘‘Deterrence and

Defense,’’ reprinted in Robert J. Art and

Kenneth N. Waltz, eds., The Use of Force:

International Politics and Foreign Policy

(New York: University Press of America,

1983), p. 129.) Alexander George and

Richard Smoke define it as, ‘‘simply the

persuasion of one’s opponent that the costs

and/or risks of a given course of action . . .

outweigh its benefits’’ (Alexander George

and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American

Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New

York: Columbia University Press, 1974), p.

11). Thomas Schelling calls deterrence ‘‘a

threat . . . intended to keep an adversary from

doing something’ (Thomas C. Schelling,

Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale

University Press, 1966), p. 69.)

The concept of nuclear deterrence became

prominent during the Cold War era with the

end of the nuclear monopoly that the US used

to enjoy. The USSR acquired the weapon in

Page 2 of 11

Journal for Studies in Management and Planning

Available at http://internationaljournalofresearch.org/index.php/JSMaP

e-ISSN: 2395-0463

Volume 01 Issue 03

April 2015

Available online: http://internationaljournalofresearch.org/ P a g e | 312

1949. This marked a period of a complex

game of nuclear deterrence. Unilateral

deterrence gave way to "mutual deterrence," a

situation of strategic stalemate. The

superpowers would refrain from attacking

each other because of the certainty of mutual

assured destruction (MAD). The concept of

MAD thus, started to play a major part in the

defence policy. In essence it also meant

stockpiling a huge nuclear arsenal.

This paper attempts to address the question

that has nuclear deterrence theory led to more

nuclearisation. And whether it is actually

relevant in maintaining stability especially in

contemporary scenario?

Methodology

The paper is mainly based on secondary

sources. The paper depends upon analytical

studies relevant for the study. It looks at

major scholarly article of Kenneth Waltz,

Robert Jervis, and Thomas Schelling and like

scholars.

Introduction

Possession of nuclear weapons is seen as the

ultimate bargaining tool in international

diplomacy-instantly giving any nuclear state a

seat at the top table. It is widely believed that

the world has become more dangerous with

the proliferation of nuclear weapon. The

bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was the

first and the last case of use of nuclear bomb.

Since then the primary purpose of much of

the nuclear strategizing has been the

maintenance of nuclear deterrence. The

strategic concept of deterrence aims to

prevent war. It is the justification virtually

every nuclear state uses for maintaining

nuclear arsenals.

Nuclear weapons have been the second force

working for peace in the post-war world.

They make the cost of war seem frighteningly

high and thus discourage states from starting

any war that might lead to the use of such

weapons. Nuclear weapons have helped

maintain peace between the great powers and

have not led their few other possessors into

military adventures.1

It was widely believed that nuclear weapons

were an important factor in the "long peace"

between the United States and the Soviet

Union during the Cold War.

There are two reasons to believe that nuclear

deterrence has indeed worked. The world has

not witnessed large scale war in the past fifty

years. Before 1945, there were two World

Wars between an interval of twenty years.

Since then nothing equivalent to the two wars

have broken out. This can be attributed to

nuclear deterrence being more effective than

conventional deterrence. In the latter a state

has to defeat its adversary’s military before it

could destroy its population. Even if one state

is much stronger than the other, they couldn’t

be certain of successfully destroying the other

side’s army. The uncertainty of war also

allows leaders of weaker states to attack

stronger ones if they are desperate enough.

Nuclear weapons are more effective in

deterrence purposes because they eliminate

1 Waltz, KN. (2001), “The Spread of Nuclear

Weapons: The more may be Better” in Fred Holroyd

(ed.) Thinking About Nuclear Weapons: Analyses and

Prescriptions, London: Routledge: 374

Page 3 of 11

Journal for Studies in Management and Planning

Available at http://internationaljournalofresearch.org/index.php/JSMaP

e-ISSN: 2395-0463

Volume 01 Issue 03

April 2015

Available online: http://internationaljournalofresearch.org/ P a g e | 313

the uncertainty in war. With nuclear weapons,

states no longer have to defeat an adversary’s

military to destroy its cities and citizens.

Furthermore, there are no real defenses

against nuclear missiles, and those missiles

travel quickly. Thus, leaders know that if they

use nuclear weapons against or threaten the

existence of a nuclear weapon state, it is

virtually certain their major cities will be

destroyed within hours.2

Secondly, the fear of mutually assured

destruction has kept belligerents from getting

into full blown war. Neither side, nor third

party, would be spared this devastation. As

Bernard Brodie, Thomas Schelling and many

other have noted what is significant about

nuclear weapons is not “overkill” but “mutual

kill”.3

That is, no country can win an all-out

nuclear weapon. The threat of mutually

assured destruction deterred the Soviet Union

and the United States (and more recently,

India and Pakistan) from going to war.

Third, the actual purpose of nuclear weapon

was never to use it, but to dissuade rival

nations from attacking. Brodie (1959) stated

“deterrence is meaningful as a strategic policy

only when we are fairly confident that the

2 Keck, Zachary (2014), “Why Nuclear Weapons

Work: Far From Being a Myth Nuclear Deterrence is

an Ironclad Law ”, The Diplomat, 13th September,

2014 URL: http://thediplomat.com/2014/09/why- nuclear-weapons-work accessed on 4th February, 2015

3

Bernard, Brodie, ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic

power and World Order (New York: Harcourt Brace,

1946); Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New

Haven: Yale University Press, 1966) quoted in Jervis,

Robert (1993), “The Political Effects of Nuclear

Weapon: A Comment”, in Sean M. Lynn-JInes and

Steven E. Miller (eds.) The Cold War and After:

Prospects of Peace, US: MIT Press: 73

retaliatory instrument upon which it relies

will not be called upon to function at all. And

that instrument, if we are to be sure of its not

being used, has to have its capacity to

function maintained at a very high level and

constantly refined-which can be done only at

great cost to the community and great

dedication on the part of the personnel

directly involved. We are, in other words,

expecting the system to be constantly

perfected while going permanently unused.”4

Countries like China and India have

committed to the No First Use policy.

Although, countries like US and UK have not

committed to No First Use, it is basically for

psychological reasons. A deterrent threat also

needs to be credible -- that is, an adversary

needs to be convinced that a retaliatory threat

will actually be executed. If not backed by the

capability and the credibility to execute

threats, deterrence is merely a dangerous

bluff. A deterrent force should therefore

provide decision-makers with options they

would conceivably execute, if their red lines

were crossed.5

For example, a robber pointing

a gun to teller’s head is using a potent threat

used to control the conflict. The robber may

not intend to actually pull the trigger.

However, the threat is credible only if the

robber is physically and mentally prepared

to blow the teller’s head off. The robbery is

successful only if the teller believes that the

robber is capable of controlled violence and

murder. In this way, nuclear weapons are

4

Brodie, Bernard (1959), , "The Anatomy of

Deterrence" in Bernard Brodie (ed.) Strategy in the

Missile Age, Princeton: Princeton University Press: 273

5 Lieber, KA, Press DG (2009), “The Nukes we Need:

Preserving the American Deterrent” Foreign Affairs,

88(6): 39-51