

**From Tribal Rebellion to State Formation in Jharkhand: *Exploring
'Development' as a Governmental Practice***

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Govern mentality and the Roots of Modern Concept of Power: an introduction

Conventional understandings of the state posit it as an external agency that acts as a neutral arbiter of competing interests in the social space. The state is assumed to be the prime signifier of the 'political', unrelated to the social whole.ⁱ Correspondingly, the state is taken to be the central locus from which power emanates, and the main function of this power is to control or curb civil society.

Such regular explanations of the state and sovereignty have been challenged over time by a developing scholarship that calls for a critical review of the nature of the modern state depending upon the transformed methods of governance. This approach is indicative of a transformation in the governmental rationale of the state which is no longer, just a policing state or an organization that maintains law and order in society. The method of the modern state is to produce *effects* of ruleⁱ through a set of governmental processes that includes "developmental, empowerment, protective and disciplinary"ⁱⁱⁱ capacities and functions.

In light of such a framework, the current essay explores the state-sponsored processes of enumeration and categorization as reflecting the governmental logic- both within the colonial and post-independent state in India- to comprehend the social scene therein. Policy formulation is not just a matter of social intervention or administering; it develops out of a system of identification to make sense of the social space, the utility of which goes beyond mere understanding or exploring society. It is not difficult to understand how these processes are instrumental in impressing an order or identity upon the same social space.

The intervening state structure in the Indian society has been, for a long time, infused with the same governmental rationale, reflected mainly in the elaborate processes of classification, defining and enumeration that have shaped the contours of public life since the colonial times. It was through census reports, maps and other statistical surveys that informed the initial understandings of the British about colonial Indian society. The same governmental logic continues in post-1947 period in India, when the state, armed with an impressive range of constitutional rights and privileges, seeks to regulate the interaction between different social actors including itself.

Analysis such as this allows us to rethink the conventional framework within which the relation between the state and social movements is viewed. It is simplistic to reduce the interaction between the state and the social movement to a mere antithetical one. Such an approach runs the risk of falling into a very straightforward and universalistic understanding of both the state and the social movement. A more critical understanding would suggest that the boundary between the state and any social movement is not as distinct as it is made out to be. The state represents the dominant interest which is only one amongst several contending interests in the social sphere. Thus, power stands negotiated and dispersed between different actors in the social space, of which the state and the movement are two competing interest. Any social movement draws considerably upon the institutional resources provided by the state, and is shaped and reshaped by this interaction over the course of time. Similarly, the state ceases to be the singular point from which political power flows out, rather it invades society in more than one visible way, corresponding with other nodes of power, including the social movement.

How do we envisage the role of the social movements vis-à-vis the governmental logic of the state? As Deborah Poole and Veena Das^{iv} suggest in a different context, we must review the perceived gap between the state and the margins, as is evident in conventional theories; we must analyze the margins created as “necessary entailment of the state.”^v This implies that the boundary between the state and society is not so distinct as it is made out to be, that the state represents an interest which is one amongst several others competing in the social space, and that power stands negotiated and dispersed between these different actors within the social space.

The discourse of 'tribal development' of the Indian state has been re-visited in the present essay as one such governmental practice. The article proceeds by investigating the nature of development in Jharkhand with particular regard to the tribal population. The discourse of development and modernization provides a backdrop to the unfolding of the movement for separate statehood in Jharkhand since the turn of the twentieth century. The paper argues that this discourse of development opens up a set of governmental practices that has come to shape politics in Jharkhand in a very distinct way. The article explores these very governmental practices, focusing on the enumeration politics of the state which generates categories like the 'tribe' and the 'scheduled tribe'.

Another central question looked into, is the impact that such governmental practices of the state have on the Jharkhand movement. I argue that *governmentalization* of the arena of the Jharkhand movement has led to a shift in its identity, nature and demands with time. Consequently, the element of singularity assumed in the Jharkhand movement- beginning with the tribal rebellions of 18th century, and ending with a separate state in year 2000- has been critically reviewed. I argue that the demand for a separate state was conjured up only at a particular moment in history of the movement, owing to the strains of governmental politics of the times. What needs to be interrogated is the role played by the demand of a separate Jharkhand within the political economy of development in the country.

Locating Development in Jharkhand

It is a known fact that the area we recognize today as Jharkhand has been a center of economic development for the country as a whole since a long time back. Be it as the southern part of the undivided state of Bihar or its political avatar as a separate state, Jharkhand with its rich deposits of natural resources, like the diversity of mineral resources and forests found therein, have allured successive governments in India as a potential site of investment, both in the colonial and the post-colonial era.

Both before and after the initiation of an independent state in India in 1947, the region of Jharkhand has been witness to the unfolding of a particular model of accumulation-based development. Extensive industrial development, systematic opening up of mines, swift urbanization are some facets of the development model as it unfolded in Jharkhand. In fact, it has

been repeated time and again by scholars that the issue of ‘development’ of the region has played a mobilizational role behind the demand, and subsequent realization, of an autonomous Jharkhand state.

A crucial factor that has historically provided urgency to the need of development in the region, and which has not gone unrecognized either in colonial or post-colonial history of the region, is the context of its scheduled population, strongly populated by the so-called tribes and the other indigenous communities. The discourse of development in Jharkhand has ranged from defining the ‘special’ needs of the ‘special’ population inhabiting the region- like the tribes as the original inhabitants- to accommodating and addressing the problems of deprivation, and marginalization of the general masses of Jharkhand.

Extensive schemes of economic development and a range of special provisions for the scheduled and indigenous population of Jharkhand represent twin moments of the singular discourse of development in the region, especially since 1947. With their own respective agendas, both discourses represent the overriding concern on the part of the state ***to enable the scheduled tribes, as the ‘object’ of development, to eventually shed their perceived innate ‘primitiveness’ and secure their assimilation in the mainstream of society.*** The identity of the ‘primitive’ is sought to be reconfigured along the lines of modern rational subject and citizen of the nation-state.

The inevitable bind of these twin moments within the development discourse in Jharkhand necessitates that the ‘primitive’ as the state developmental object be identified first. These processes of identification and codification constitute one part of the complex governmental terrain where the politics of the colonial and post-colonial state in India has played out, as they have proceeded to deal with the question of the tribes.

A commonsensical imagination of the ‘tribe’ that has dominated the psyche of the non-tribal population for almost all ages now, is of semi-naked, bow and arrow wielding people who dance and sing their way through an idyllic life, tucked away in dense forests in remote parts of the country, untouched and unaware of the modern day amenities that define civilization and rationality. The ‘tribe’ is always described with reference to what it *lacks*, especially against our accepted ideas of modernity and material progress. Needless to say, this makes us complicit in

the process of ‘othering’ the tribe. Such a perception is also reflected in the official discourse of the state on tribes, and has fuelled its developmental imperatives.

The state processes of enlistment and codification have, however, a larger role to play in the political economy of the developing state in India. It is not difficult to see how they help to ground the legitimacy, imperativeness and even inevitability, of a particular model of accumulation-based development in the country. This is very evident in Jharkhand, where the movement for separate statehood, had historically come to organize itself around the binary of ‘pro-development and anti-development.’ This has also meant that those tribal and indigenous communities, who resist onslaught on their traditional livelihoods, indigenous institutions and cultural identity in the name of modernization projects at the behest of the state and private companies, are inevitably dubbed as being anti-development and anti-national, by extension.

The arena of the Jharkhand movement has seen these various forces interacting with each other, abetting and aiding, and at other times, entering into conflicts with each other. State categorization of tribes and non-tribes, scheduled and non-scheduled population has shaped politics in Jharkhand, containing and empowering it in myriad and contradictory ways. The looming project of modernization of the scheduled population in the region has been a background to these complex processes. The next two sections deal with two main actors in the bind: the state and the social movement.

The Politics of Governance: an Interrogation of the Categories of ‘Tribe’ and ‘Scheduled Tribe’

The current section explores the aspect of the state- both colonial and post-colonial- as an important agent of change within the Jharkhand movement that ensues transformations in the identity and demands of the latter. The state sponsored categories of ‘tribe’ and ‘scheduled’ tribe, has been explored; and how these categories are employed within the Jharkhand movement to meet certain political ends. It is contended that the methodological shift in the governmental logic of the modern state, casts impending changes within the social space of the movement. While the transformations within the movement and contestations generated therein are the subject-matter of the next section, we look at what constitutes per se the governmental rationale of the modern state, in the present section.

Tribes and Scheduled Tribes: The 'Primitive' Within

There is no denying the fact that the British colonial rule in India was as much a “cultural project of control”^{vi} as it was about direct occupation. The political economy of the colonial rule rested on not just brute force, but also on discursive means: it was done foremostly by reconstituting the societal space in India along the line of new categories, which served the imperial rulers to restructure the social relations herein, in a manner more conducive to their own rule.

The British attempts to impress a new order upon the colonial society were contingent upon accumulating knowledge about that society. Beginning with benign and often isolated methods like travelogues, personal narratives and accounts, the colonial rulers moved on to more scientific methods to amass objective and rational knowledge about the ruled, roping in scientific disciplines like ethnography and anthropometry. Similarly, huge reserves of archives, census reports, administrative documents and gazettes, were produced which alone gave British the access to the ‘truth’ about India. These governmental processes indicated, what one scholar describes as the “colonial institutionalization of science and statistics”^{vii} dependent upon “immobilizing, labeling and enumerating bodies.”^{viii}

The ‘civilizational’ and ‘racial’ bias inherent in the resultant colonial discourse on the Indian society cannot be emphasized enough. It is through such processes of ‘legitimate’ knowledge production and categorization that the colonial state could regulate competing claims to representation in the public sphere.

The colonial encounter with the aboriginal communities in the Jharkhand region, also known Chotanagpur, began against a background where the British could not devise a suitable way to club these communities, along with the untouchables within the Hindu fold. There exist rich historical accounts of how the British’s attempts to bring the region within a centralized administrative and revenue system were met with fierce resistance in form of a series of revolts by indigenous communities of Chotanagpur. These uprisings like the Kol rebellion (1813-1832), the Sathal insurrection (1855) and the Munda rebellion (1895-1900) were perceived by the colonizers as ‘insurgencies’ by a ‘primitive’ people, who were untouched by any hint of modernity and progress. The colonial rulers first expounded the concept of ‘tribe’ in the context of these revolts, and designated them as ‘tribal’ uprisings.

Such a contention is not to dispute the sociological fact of the presence of ethnically distinct communities like the *adivasis* in the region. However, what must not be overlooked is the politics behind the colonial taxonomy and its repercussions on local society

and economy in the region. The colonial category of the tribe invoked the figure of a primitive, who was “necessarily body-centric, unthinking, extravagant and even violent.”^{ix} Similarly, the revolts of the nineteenth century- perceived by scholars as probably the first set of organized resistance through organized violence^x against illegal land-usurpation and forcible rent-collection- were dubbed by the colonizers as nothing more than “petty disturbance, and robbery, which a few policemen would soon eventually suppress.”^{xi}

Therefore, in a way, the colonial rulers led a discursive assault by refusing to acknowledge the *political* content of these tribal revolts, treating them instead as isolated incidents of outbreak and unrest, most probably cause by the *lack* of any law and order in the region. Moreover, the perpetually rebellious state of the tribes was taken as a condition born out of their “primordality and passion.”^{xii}

The typical colonial response to such outbreaks was then, in terms of even more centralization, materialized through complex legal-administrative restructuring and deployment of an elaborate network of police, judiciary, rent collectors, *jagirdars* and *tehsildars*, *zamindars* etc. By the time Chotanagpur was brought under the direct jurisdiction of the Lieutenant-Governorship of Bengal as a ‘Non-Regulation Province’ by the Act XX in 1854^{xiii}, the region crawled with, as put by a scholar, “foreigners from Bengal and Bihar unacquainted with the customs, the land tenures and the languages of the people.”^{xiv}

A bigger threat posed by ever increasing centralization of rule witnessed in colonial Chotanagpur, was that it was based on institutionalization of the fact of ethnic differences between different communities in the region along the axis of ‘tribal’ vs ‘non-tribal’. The ‘isolationist’ policy of the British colonial rulers translated into a set of legal provisions to maintain “a state of semi-autonomous rule in tribal areas (to) deal with certain problems associated with the tribal areas, notably land alienation and exploitation by money lenders.”^{xv}

Such a system enabled the colonial rulers to cover up their own complicity in the system of extraction and exploitation, by rendering it a ‘problem’ between the tribal and the *diku* (non-

tribal) moneylender. By proposing a series of legislative measures to protect the *adivasis*, they managed to thrust the 'problem' of extortion as being something innate to the identity of a moneylender as a *diku* and the *adivasi* who was always available to be duped and maneuvered, "primitive, simple and unsophisticated"^{xvi} as he was. Thus the isolationist stance of the British was conspicuous in its translation into more and more centralized and paternalistic control over the tribes.

On the basis of this brief foray, we can say that the project of colonial modernization in the so-called primitive, tribal tracts of the Jharkhand region, produced an outcome that was in stark contrast to what the tribal rebellions put forward as their essential demand, i.e. autonomy as against centralized control over local economy, cultural identity and indigenous institutions of the communities therein. The question of 'autonomy' of indigenous communities assumes a bigger significance in the present context, when we have a separate state of Jharkhand since the year 2000, as a state professedly for the 'upliftment' and 'development' of the tribes.

As soon as the question of 'development' of the tribes- reincarnated as scheduled tribes as per the independent Constitution of India- comes up, we find the discourse to be marred by similar contradictions and strains as were visible in the colonial project of modernization and development. This is mostly because the terms of the discourse on 'tribal development' have remained unchanged in post-colonial state in India.

The identity of the 'scheduled tribe' remains very much rooted in the (colonial) idea of a tribe as a relational or transitional identity, especially against our assumed notions of modernity and progress. The main indicators that guide the definition of a scheduled tribe, as per Article 342, Clause 1 of the Constitution, are- "geographical isolation, use of simple technology, living conditions, general backwardness..."^{xvii} Blindly applying such a definition on most tribal population across the length and breadth of the country, the post-colonial state in India puts forward its chief concern as centered upon 'assimilation' of the tribes into mainstream civilization. One can read a similarity of orientation in both colonial and post-colonial state in India, which was directed towards *enabling* the tribes, to shed their innate 'primitiveness' and lead more 'meaningful' lives.

The element of continuity understood between the categories of 'tribes' and 'scheduled tribes' or in the present day constitutional provisions of the Fifth & Sixth Schedule and the colonial demarcation of tribal regions as 'Excluded' or 'Partially Excluded' Area, is seen as indicative of unsuccessful decolonization at the discursive level. Be it the nationalistic fervor attached to tribal assimilation policy since the Nehruvian times, or the present day Jharkhand state as the homeland of tribes, there runs an overt theme to 'centralize and develop' the 'primitive' *adivasi* on the path towards political and economic modernization.

These were some of the debates that informed the state categorization of 'tribes' and 'scheduled tribes'. This process has been, since the colonial times, more obsessed with the identifying populations as tribes, than with properly and uniformly defining them.^{xviii} The inconsistency which characterizes this defining process has led to a proliferation of identities over the time identifying people as 'tribes'. It is not surprising to find that the identity of the scheduled tribe has a legacy of predecessor terms like the aboriginal tribes, backward tribes, primitive tribes, forest tribes, forest and hill tribes, indigenous tribes, aboriginal forest and gypsy tribes etc, most of which were in the nature of "incomplete exercises and complicated sub categories....produced to meet the political necessities."^{xix} It is needless to say how each of these categories, ends up excluding more people and communities, shuffling them between endless lists and categories.

Changing Contours of the Jharkhand Movement: Politics of Internalization and Contestation

The next section explores the correspondence between the movement and the "enlistment exercise"^{xx} of the state, which has implications for processes of generation of self-identity within the movement. It is important to understand how the Jharkhand movement has seen transformation in the process of either internalizing the state categorization or even challenging it.

As was made clear in the previous section, the prerogative of the state over identification and categorization of the social body, gives it a control over whom to give representation and in what capacity. However, far from being a one-way process, the governmental processes of the state are susceptible to challenges from societal forces and both exert considerable influences on each

other. Administrative categories over time cease to be limited only to administrative practices; they acquire a socio-political meaning. Within the terrain of the Jharkhand movement that was fast-transforming, we explore how the state sponsored categories like scheduled tribe, has a bearing upon the movement and how they remain a contested category within that sphere.

The correspondence between the movement and the governmental processes can be studied at different levels. Due to limited space, the chapter explores this question at the level of institutional politics that shaped up in Jharkhand since the beginning of twentieth century; and by institutional politics, I mean the competitive politics of different political organizations that emerge during this period in Chotanagpur region, each with a particular notion of self-identity, and criteria for membership. Needless to say, each of such organizations was in constant correspondence with the state politics of identification in one way or the other.

As a context to this trajectory, one must keep in mind the shifting contours of the background: the changing nature of the Indian state and the concretization of its identity as a political sovereign in 1947, which also meant that the objective of national integration sought to do away with all kinds of sectarianism or provincialism; the codification of the political rights of the minorities including the scheduled tribes in the free constitution, which set the rules for institutional politics both at the national and local levels; the mediating force of Christianity which emerged as a major political identity arbitrating different interests in Chotanagpur, and the entry of left politics in the decade of the 1970s owing to development of a new industrial mass base in Jharkhand.

The 'coming-of-age' of Politics in Jharkhand

The colonial position on the question of tribes in Chotanagpur and elsewhere was conspicuous by a mixed attitude of condescension and paternalism. By codifying the identity of the tribes in a particular way, the British were able to ground the necessity of protection and modernization for these tribal communities. Categorization of the tribes also led to identification of the non-tribal communities, and through the precision of science, the colonial rules institutionalized the supposed natural divide between the tribes and the non-tribal communities. The binary served to further strengthen the colonial claims that the tribes needed protection from the '*diku*' or the

‘outsiders’ and in this, they paved the way for greater centralization of political and economic power in their own hands.

The post-colonial state in India unquestioningly adopted the colonial understanding of the tribes, along with its essentialist nomenclature, and the unflinching belief in the necessity of a centralized model of development and modernization. At the level of the Jharkhand movement, the nationalistic model of state-building was accepted as the dominant mode through which imperatives of development and efficient governance could be answered. Thus these regional parties like the Jharkhand Party (JHP), Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (JMM) and All Jharkhand Students Union (AJSU), to name a few, internalized this model of governance, acceding to the bases on which such a model rested. Guided by the contours set by the institutional-representative politics of the times, the political parties indigenous to the region of Chotanagpur acquired the nature of regional forces, mobilizing the masses towards the goal of a separate Jharkhand.

To recall, the term ‘Jharkhand’ was coined in the year 1939^{xxi} when Adivasi Mahasabha placed its demand for a complete separation of Chotanagpur from the state of Bihar. Lack of space does not allow for much details, however, if we look at early *Jharkhandi* organizations like the Chotanagpur Unnati Samaj, or the Adivasi Mahasabha, we find an orientation towards organized party-based politics, as that visible at the national level, because “the government could be appealed to only by a show of public opinion for which an organized party was essential.”^{xxii} In addition, constant references were made to the ‘power of vote’ for agriculture, educational and economic development of the region. Appeals were made for accommodation of the so-called *adivasi* movement within the larger anti-colonial movement led by the nationalist Congress. According to leaders like Jaipal Singh, granting a provincial status to Chotanagpur, was reflective of the credibility of the Congress party in taking as its “primary duty and fundamental policy, to protect the religious, linguistic, cultural and other rights of the minorities in India so as to ensure for them in any scheme of Government..., the widest scope for their development and their participation in the fullest measure in the political, economic and cultural life of the nation.”^{xxiii}

The point being made through these examples is that the Jharkhandi leaders of the time readily weaved their politics into the dominant language of the nationalist movement and the project of state-building. It is in this context that the political idea of 'Adibasisdom' or a separate state of Jharkhand was born. This is the ***foremost impact of the governmental processes on the demands of the Jharkhand movement***. As said earlier, the rebellions of the eighteenth century Chotanagpur, demanded 'tribal autonomy' against centralized control by the state over lives and livelihoods of indigenous communities. They were directed against the illegal encroachment upon the pre-existing political and economic organization and institutions of the local communities. The rebellions were against the new legal structures that displaced these communities from their own land owing to lack of any legal document of proof. In all, these tribal revolts and rebellions of 18th-19th centuries were geared towards reinstating all that was lost to colonial or external encroachment.

Against such a notion of 'tribal autonomy'- it can be argued- what appears as strikingly antagonistic is the centralized notion of power that the present state of Jharkhand represents. Based on a national model of state and nation-building, and imbued with a deep-rooted belief in developmentalism, it is worth asking if the separate state of Jharkhand mirrors the issues of autonomy and self-determination as raised during the tribal rebellions.

One probable answer to this question could be in negative, and mainly because the political classes in Jharkhand never really questioned the terms and conditions of the mainstream development model. In fact, it can be argued that the exorbitant levels of economic and cultural displacement of the indigenous communities in Jharkhand are mainly development-induced.

Thus it is not surprising to find that all related issues and demands pertaining to exploitative development model, displacement of lives and livelihood of indigenous communities in wake of industrial expansion in the region, de-peasantization, indiscriminate exploitation of natural resources, growing urban slums and incidence of poverty and unemployment, including loss of cultural identity- all these questions were relegated to the primary demand of a separate state. A separate state for the indigenous communities rested on a trope of self-determination, that is, the indigenous communities could best develop only when they had political power in their hands.

A second impact that can be read within the arena of the Jharkhand movement owing to processes of governmentalization, is *a transformation in the identity of the movement*. For long, the Jharkhand movement had been identified as a 'tribal' movement in the state discourse. It has been stated before that the colonial government utilized the fact of the tribal-non tribal divided to contain and even neutralize the tribal revolts to a great extent. In the post-colonial phase in India, we see a similar trend when the claims of separate statehood was rejected by the central government or the State Reorganization Committee (SRC) on the basis of the fact that tribes constituted a minority in the region; moreover these tribal communities were not unanimous on their demand for a separate state. The SRC also maintained that the tribes in Chotanagpur could not be treated as one homogenous community for the lack of any one dominant language.^{xxiv}

In the light of these developments that the political classes in Jharkhand were forced to rethink the social bases of their politics. The decision to call for a joint platform for all communities, tribes and non-tribes alike, was to increase the strength behind the demand for a separate state. In addition, it also help the Jharkhandi parties to fight inner factionalism and divisive politics played in the name of tribals vs sadans or even, Christian adivasis vs non-christian adivasis.

Needless to say, in the new scheme of things, the criteria for defining an indigenous community also gets transformed, because the new goal of 'development' encompasses all communities inhabiting the region. In a blunt contrast to the tribal rebellions of the earlier century, mobilized for tribal autonomy and freedom from the exploitative '*diku*' rule, the new demand in the twentieth century shaped up due to several transformed imperatives. It was the phase when institutional politics in this region necessitated the mobilization, and consequently, accommodation of the non-tribal population within the fold of the movement, thereby expanding its social base. The most visible of the changes was the shift in the identity of the *adivasi* and the *diku* who now were mobilized on an equal footing to achieve separate statehood.

In the conventional histories of Jharkhand, the widening base of the social movement- which now specifically aimed at attaining a separate state of Jharkhand- has been perceived as a shift from 'ethnicity' to 'regionalism' within the movement. With this shift, the issue of 'regional' development of Jharkhand implies the dilution of the 'ethnic' edge of the movement. It also implies that the developmentalism assumed in the regional identity of Jharkhand clubs together

the interests of the *adivasi* population with that of their traditional exploiters, rests as it on the development of all the communities of Jharkhand.

Similarly, the entry of the Left in the Jharkhand region since the 1970s is also taken as one instance of the dominant development discourse in Jharkhand being reconfigured in terms of regional interests, thereby completely overlooking the specific “cultural configuration”^{xxv} of the people of this region. Likewise, one cannot fail to notice that majority of the ethnic population has been concentrated in extremely poor, low-paid and low-skilled jobs in the industrial sector in Jharkhand, like peons, *khalasis* etc, resembling what Javed Alam terms as “ethnic sub-proletariat”,^{xxvi} indicating a hierarchy in what is called the working class in Jharkhand.

Conclusion

In the preceding pages, we have looked at the correspondence between the governmental processes and the shifting contours of the Jharkhand movement. The main argument is to review the conventional understandings of relationship between the state and social movement. Instead of treating them as isolated or disconnected social-political phenomena, one must try to see how both invade each other’s terrain in more than one way. Through example of a transforming Jharkhand movement, it has been argued that processes of governmentalization open up new spaces of interaction between the different actors within that social domain. Such an analysis also forces us to rethink traditional definitions of power and its relation with state sovereignty. Rather, power needs to be understood in its capillary form, running through the entire social body, emanating at diffused points, and displaying its potential in a variety of forms like empowerment and disciplining.

Endnotes

ⁱ Often in the nature of a Weberian state as a bureaucratic organization with its various administrative institutions, army and police personnel, imbued with a formal legal rationality.

ⁱⁱ David Scott. 1999. *Refashioning Futures: Criticism After Postcoloniality*, Princeton University Press, p. 25

ⁱⁱⁱ Stuart Corbridge, Glyn Williams, Manoj Srivastava, Rene Veron. 2003. Making Social Science Matter- I: How the Local State Works in Rural Bihar, Jharkhand and West Bengal, *Economic and Political Weekly*, 38/24, pp 2377-2389

^{iv} Veen a Das and Deborah Poole. 2004. *Anthropology in the Margins of the State*, School of American Research Press

^v Ibid p. 2

^{vi} Nicholas B. Dirks. 1996. Foreword, in Bernard Cohn. *Colonialism and its Forms of Knowledge*, Princeton University Press, p. ix

^{vii} Peter Pels. 1999. The Rise and the Fall of Indian Aborigines, in Peter Pels and Oscar Salemink (eds) *Colonial Subjects: Essays on the Practical History of Anthropology*, University of Michigan Press, p. 45

^{viii} Ibid p. 87

^{ix} Prathama Bannerjee. 2006. Culture/Politics: the Irresoluble Double-bind of the Indian Adivasis, *The Indian Historical Review*, 33/1, p. 100

^x Christoph von Furer-Haimendorf, in the foreword to Birsa Munda: Centennial Edition, New Delhi: Seagull Books, 2002, p. xxiii

^{xi} J. C. Jha, The Kol Insurrection of Chota Nagpur, Calcutta: Thacker, Spink & Co. Private Ltd., 1964, p. 130

^{xii} Prathama Bannerjee, "Culture/Politics: the Irresoluble Double-bind of the Indian Adivasis", *The Indian Historical Review*, vol. 33, 2006 p. 100

^{xiii} For more information, see S.C. Roy, the Mundas and Their Country, Bombay: Asia Publishing house, 1912, p. 130

^{xiv} Ibid p. 106

^{xv} Alistair Macmillan. 2005. *Standing at the Margins: Representation and Electoral Representation in India*, New Delhi: OUP, p. 112

^{xvi} Ibid

^{xvii} Virginius Xaxa. 2008. *State, Society and Tribes: Issues in Post-colonial India*, p. 4

^{xviii} Virginius Xaxa. 1999. Tribes as Indigenous People of India, *Economic and Political Weekly*, 34/51, p. 3589

^{xix} Nirmal Sengupta. 1988. Reappraising Tribal Movements: II: Legitimization and Spread, *Economic and Political Weekly*, 23/20, p. 1003

^{xx} Ibid p. 1004

^{xxi} Anunabha Ghosh. 1993. Ideology and Politics of the Jharkhand Movement: an Overview, *Economic and Political Weekly*, 28/35, p. 1788

^{xxii} *Chotanagpur Unnati Samaj ki Vaarshik Mahasabha ki Sankshipt Report aur Chotanagpur Adivasi Sabha ki Utpatti, 1938*, in Balbir Dutt. 2005. *Kahani Jharkhand Andolan ki, Itihaas se Sakshatkar*. (translation self)

^{xxiii} Presidential Address to the All-India Adivasi Mahasabha, 1948, in Ramdayal Munda and S. Bosu Mullick (eds) 2003. *The Jharkhand Movement, Indigenous Peoples' Struggle for Autonomy in India*, Copenhagen: IWGIA, pp 2-14

^{xxiv} Report submitted by States Reorganization Commission rejecting the demand for Creation of Jharkhand State Chapter XIV Bihar, in Balbir Dutt. 2005. *Kahani Jharkhand Andolan ki, Itihaas se Sakshatkar*, p. 520

^{xxv} Javed Alam. 2003. The Category of Non-historic Nations and Tribal Identity in Jharkhand, in S. Bosu Mullick and R.D. Munda (eds) *The Jharkhand Movement: Indigenous Peoples' Struggle for Autonomy in India*, p. 197.

^{xxvi} Ibid p. 198

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